The distinguished philosopher Robert M. Adams presents a major work on virtue, which is once again a central topic in ethical thought. A Theory of Virtue is a systematic, comprehensive framework for thinking about the moral evaluation of character, proposing that virtue is chiefly a matter of being for what is good, and that virtues must be intrinsically excellent and not just beneficial or useful.

The place of self-concern in Christian love is studied, beginning with Fénelon's extreme claim that in perfect love for God one would desire nothing for its own sake except that God's will be done. This view is criticized. A distinction is made between self-interest (desire for one's own good for its own sake) and other sorts of self-concern; and it is argued that self-concern has an important role in the Christian virtues, but that self-interest has a less important role than (...) other sorts of self-concern. Finally, it is argued that Eros and Agape are not opposites, but Agape includes a certain sort of Eros. (shrink)

Divine Motivation theory is a major contribution both to the philosophy of religion, particularly the philosophy of religious ethics, and to general ethical theory. It is demanding reading, because it is long and complex and about difficult issues. It is also rewarding, because it is suggestive and highly original, written and argued with philosophical intelligence and disciplined care, and rich in systematic connections and explanations of them.

This paper has three parts. The first outlines the history of Nestorianism. From the end of the fifth century all the way into the thirteenth century, quite a large population—in fact most Christians in Asia—belonged to branches of the Nestorian church. The second part provides a brief biography of Nestorius, after whom this church was named. The third part explores two elements of Nestorius’s christology, as they are found in his posthumously discovered theological writings. Does Christ have one nature or (...) two, and if two, how can one person have two natures? To what extent was Adam, the first man, created for a role that Christ eventually fulfilled? (shrink)

This long-awaited book by one of the world's leading philosophers offers a systematic account of kinds of being, ways in which things can be or can fail to be.

Versions of this paper have been read to philosophical colloquia at Occidental College and California State University, Fullerton. I am indebted to participants in those discussions, to students in many of my classes, and particularly to Marilyn McCord Adams, Van Harvey, Thomas Kselman, William Laserow, and James Muyskens, for helpful comment on the ideas which are contained in this paper (or which would have been, had it not been for their criticisms).

Robert Merrihew Adams has been a leader in renewing philosophical respect for the idea that moral obligation may be founded on the commands of God. This collection of Adams' essays, two of which are previously unpublished, draws from his extensive writings on philosophical theology that discuss metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical issues surrounding the concept of God--whether God exists or not, what God is or would be like, and how we ought to relate ourselves to such a (...) being. Adams studies the relation between religion and ethics, delving into an analysis of moral arguments for theistic belief. In several essays, he applies contemporary studies in the metaphysics of individuality, possibility and necessity, and counterfactual conditionals to issues surrounding the existence of God and problems of evil. (shrink)

I have argued elsewhere that there are facts, and possibilities, that are not purely qualitative. In a second paper, however, I have argued that all possibilities are purely qualitative except insofar as they involve individuals that actually exist. In particular, I have argued that there are no thisnesses of nonactual individuals (where the thisness of x is the property of being x, or of being identical with x), and that there are no singular propositions about nonactual individuals (where a singular (...) proposition about an individual x is a proposition that involves or refers to x directly, perhaps by having x or the thisness of x as a constituent, and not merely by way of x's qualitative properties or relations to other individuals). I am also inclined to believe that there are not yet any thisnesses of individuals that will exist but do not yet, nor any singular propositions about future individuals--and, hence, that all possibilities are purely qualitative except insofar as they involve individuals that already do exist or have existed (counting timeless individuals, if any, as already existing). This thesis about the relation of time to thisness is the subject of the present paper, in which the conclusions of my previous papers will be presupposed. (shrink)

The central idea of T. M. Scanlon’s “contractualism” has been well known to ethical theorists since Scanlon 1982. In What We Owe to Each Other it has grown into a comprehensive and impressively developed theory of the nature of right and wrong—or at least of what Scanlon regards as the most important of the “normative kinds” that go under the names of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’. Rejecting aggregative consequentialism, Scanlon aims to articulate principles of right and wrong for individual action in (...) such a way that the interests of each affected person are taken fairly into account. (shrink)

It is striking that most of the essays in this Focus do not explore the specifically religious aspects of Enlightenment ethical thought. A principled reason for this may be found in a conception of religion that makes it hard for Enlightenment thinkers to seem religious at all. Neither does this conception fit anything that is likely to be a live option for most people today, and the now prevalent unpopularity of eighteenth-century piety and religious thought may blind us to important (...) religious possibilities. (shrink)

In responding here to four respected colleagues I am grateful for their perceptive, and sympathetic but not uncritical, attention to my book. I discuss their comments in an order that permits me to focus first on the good and then on the right. I begin with some remarks addressed to two of my critics at once; there follow sections addressed to each of the four individually.

Because of their vastness and rather fragmentary character, the writings of Leibniz leave the student unusually dependent on secondary literature for guidance. That the literature on Leibniz is exceptionally good is all the more reason to welcome the kind of orientation to the riches of both primary and secondary sources that this Companion aims to provide. Announcing itself as “the most accessible and comprehensive guide to Leibniz currently available” for nonspecialists and “a conspectus of recent developments in the interpretation of (...) Leibniz” for specialists, it lives up to both aspirations remarkably well. (shrink)

The paper is an interpretation and defense of Kant's conception of things in themselves as noumena, along the following lines. Noumena are transempirical realities. As such they have several important roles in Kant's critical philosophy (Section 1). Our theoretical faculties cannot obtain enough content for a conception of noumena that would assure their real possibility as objects, but can establish their merely formal logical possibility (Sections 2-3). Our practical reason, however, grounds belief in the real possibility of some noumena, and (...) even knowledge of the noumenal reality of a free will (Section 4). Section 5 defends Kant's conception of noumena as a good piece of philosophy, particularly with respect to its distinction between logical and real possibility. Are noumena numerically identical with experienced (phenomenal) objects? Kantian principles yield the answers that human selves are, God isn't, and it's harder to say about bodies (Section 6). (shrink)

The paper explores the extent to which self-love, as understood by Bishop Butler, may be in harmony with altruistic virtue. Whereas Butler was primarily concerned to rebut suspicions directed against altruism, the suspicions principally addressed by the present writer are directed against self-love. It is argued that the main vices of self-preference---particularly selfishness, self-centeredness, and arrogance---are not essentially excesses of self-love and, indeed, do not necessarily involve self-love. lt is argued further that self-love is something one is typically taught as (...) a child, for socially compelling reasons. This suggests how a healthy self-love and a healthy commitment to the common good can be integrated and will normally be in harmony. (shrink)

Christian theology is one of the most neglected areas of Leibniz’s thought. It is a subject that engaged his attention throughout his intellectual career. He seems to have been very well informed about the main currents of theological opinion in his own time, and to have had an extensive knowledge of historic doctrinal positions. He left behind a wealth of letters and unpublished papers discussing topics in revealed theology; but this resource for understanding both his own thought and the history (...) of theology at the dawn of the Enlightenment remains largely unmined. The Academy edition of Leibniz’s works includes as yet no systematic project for the publication of his theological papers—the largest class of his papers—although important treatments of theological subjects are finding their way into series I and VI. Gaston Grua surveyed and assembled a large quantity of theological texts, but these are organized around Grua’s interest in Leibniz’s theodicy, so that Leibniz’s views on topics such as grace, predestination, and theological method are represented much more richly than other topics in revealed theology. Another topic much discussed in the secondary literature is Leibniz’s treatment of eucharistic theology, which has attracted attention because it is involved both in his negotiations about reunion of the churches and in some of his major discussions of issues about corporeal substance. But other central topics of Christian theology have received much less attention in the secondary literature; and this is true in particular of the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation, even though they are rich in metaphysical resonance and Leibniz had quite a lot to say about them. (shrink)

Leibniz's version of the ontological argument, a modal argument for theism on which he worked most intensively in the 1670s, has two stages. The first, an “incomplete” proof, concludes that God can only be a necessary being, and therefore if God's existence is possible, then God exists. The second stage is an a priori argument that the existence of such a necessary God is indeed possible. Leibniz's fullest attempts at a possibility proof turn on his conception of a most perfect (...) being, and the chapter concludes that they are not likely to succeed, in part because of difficulties in connecting the concepts of perfection and necessary existence. (shrink)

The relation between primitive and derivative forces may be the hardest problem about the relation between Leibniz's physics and his metaphysics. He holds that derivative forces are modifications of primitive forces, but also that physical forces, which he classifies as derivative forces, belong to bodies, which are aggregates, whereas primitive forces belong to unextended perceiving substances and constitute their essence. This chapter addresses this problem, arguing that a major part of it can be solved on the supposition that physical events (...) are only phenomena, and hence ultimately determined by modifications of the primitive forces of perceiving substances. (shrink)

In confirmation of the conclusions of Ch. 11, examination of the principal relevant texts from the period 1685–1704 shows that Leibnizian primary matter is not an ultimate substratum or subject of properties, but only an aspect of, and abstraction from, such a subject or substance. Specifically it is the passive principle in the essence or primitive force of an unextended, perceiving substance, and all its operations are aspects of the perceptual operation of the substance.

The essay is about the “Preliminary Expectoration” of Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling. It argues that “the absurd” there refers primarily to the practical paradox that in faith (so it is claimed) one must simultaneously renounce and gladly accept a loved object. In other words it is about a problem of detachment as a feature of religious life. The paper goes on to interpret, and discuss critically, the views expressed in the book about both renunciation (infinite resignation) and the nature of (...) faith. (shrink)

This work is ''a systematic ontology.'' Ontology is the study of being as such, and a systematic ontology is an account of the most fundamental ways of being something or other - of what they are and of how they are related to each other. The questions it pursues are not primarily about what causes things, but about what things are or consist in - though causal questions cannot be totally avoided. The title of the work, What Is, and What (...) Is in Itself, marks the most important distinction in ways of being. What is includes everything there is, but not everything there is included in what is in itself. The first five chapters of the book define and examine the ways of being: in chapters 1 and 2, being actual or existing, or even just being something without existing or being actual; in chapter 3, being an intentional object, and perhaps a merely intentional object; in chapter 4, relations between things and their properties; and in chapter 5, being a thing in itself. Chapter 6 discusses whether only conscious beings are things in themselves, and suggests an affirmative answer. Chapter 7 discusses the epistemology of ontology. Chapters 8 and 9 discuss issues about thisness and identity. And chapters 10 and 11 discuss mainly occasionalist and panentheist answers to questions about the causal unity of the universe. (shrink)

Leibniz’s religious cosmopolitanism is one of the main ways in which his thought foreshadows the Enlightenment. Of the controversial issues of his time, it is the one on which he was boldest. His commitment to it is discussed here in relation to both the Chinese Rites Controversy and the reunion of Christendom, and the main features of his conception of religion are discussed. (1) It is a religious and normative conception. (2) Its main principle is “the love of God above (...) all things.” (3) It involves a principled pragmatism on many, perhaps most, religious issues. The implications of this pragmatism are traced for (4) Leibniz’s ecclesiology and (5) his strategies for interpreting religious concepts. (6) The relatively abstract and ahistorical character of religious essentials on Leibniz’s view is acknowledged. (shrink)